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EMPLOYEE HANDLING OF LISTED PROPERTY
— by Neil E. Harl*
For many years,1 property capable of both business use
and personal use and classified as “listed property” has been
subject to special rules on depreciation that can be claimed.2
Additional limitations are imposed on the use of listed
property by employees.3
General rules
The statute designates six classes of property as “listed
property”— (1) passenger automobiles,4 (2) any other
property used as a means of transportation,5 (3) property “of
a type generally used” for “entertainment, recreation or
amusement,”6 (4) computers or peripheral equipment,7 (5)
cellular telephones (or “other similar telecommunications”
equipment)8 and (6) “any other property” added by
regulations.9  The term “passenger automobile” is defined
as a four wheel vehicle manufactured primarily for use on
public streets, roads and highways of 6,000 pounds
unloaded gross vehicle weight or less (gross vehicle weight
for trucks and vans).10 These vehicles are subject to dollar
limits on depreciation that can be claimed each year.11  For
vehicles placed in service in 1997, those figures are $3,160
the first year, $5,000 the second year, $3,050 the third year
and $1,775 each succeeding year.12  Vehicles used as a
means of transportation that are not “passenger
automobiles” are “listed property” but are not subject to the
dollar limitations on depreciation claimable.13
For all items of listed property, if the property is not
“predominantly used in a qualified business use,” expense
method depreciation may not be claimed14 and depreciation
deductions must be calculated using the alternative
depreciation method.15  The term “predominantly” means
used more than 50 percent in a qualified business use.16  If
that condition is met, MACRS depreciation deductions may
be claimed to the extent of the business use percentage.
Employee use
For an employee acquiring a mixed use asset subject to
the “listed property” rules,17 usage is not considered as
business use unless it is for the convenience of the employer
and is required as a condition of employment.18  Those two
tests have been extraordinarily difficult to meet.  Indeed,
employees have only rarely been successful in obtaining a
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deduction for listed property.  Thus, an elementary school
teacher has been unsuccessful in obtaining a depreciation
deduction for a home computer,19 an OSHA employee has
failed in obtaining a deduction for a computer printer,20 an
engineer has been unable to claim a depreciation deduction
for a computer used at home,21 an insurance salesman has
been denied a deduction for a computer purchased for use
when visiting clients to perform computer functions
otherwise performed by office staff,22 and a computer staff
analyst who purchased a home computer to reduce travel
time and avoid the effects of adverse weather was
unsuccessful in obtaining a deduction23
A 1996 Tax Court case, however, allowed a deduction
for home use of a computer and printer.24  In the facts of
that case, the taxpayer was a telemarketing sales manager
for a regional telephone company.25  The taxpayer used the
computer and printer to access information at home via
modem to keep up with her work.  The taxpayer was denied
access to her office after regular business hours so she was
unable to use the office computer.
The court cited approvingly a case stating that the
“convenience of the employer” test and the “condition of
employment” test in the context of lodging provided to an
employee26 were essentially the same.27  The court stated
that the tests are facts and circumstances in nature, that the
employer need not explicitly require the employee to use
the property but yet a mere statement by the employer that
use of the property is a condition of employment is not
sufficient.28  The court pointed out that in order to satisfy
the condition of employment requirement, the use of the
property must be required in order for the employee to
perform the duties of employment properly.29  The Tax
Court agreed with the taxpayer in Mulne v. Commissioner
and held that the purchase of the computer and printer was
for the convenience of the employer and was required as a
condition of employment. 30  Accordingly, the taxpayer was
allowed to claim expense method depreciation on the
computer and printer which were both used exclusively for
business purposes.31
The court also examined the question of whether the
cost of a camera and a telephone were deductible.  The
court stated that neither item was listed property.  The
camera was found to be used exclusively for business
purposes and qualified for expense method depreciation;32
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the court denied a deduction for the telephone on the
grounds it was not an ordinary and necessary expense and
the court doubted that the telephone was used in the home
office only for business purposes.33
In conclusion
In light of the cases and rulings to date, it is clear that
employees bear a fairly heavy burden in establishing
deductibility for listed property items such as computers.
However, it is possible to succeed in obtaining a
depreciation deduction if the facts in support of
deductibility are persuasive.34
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
CONTINUOUS POSSESSION. The disputed land
was .534 acres included in the title held by the plaintiff
farmer. The land was triangular shaped and fenced on two
sides and provided access to a road to the defendant’s
residence. The defendant’s parents purchased the ranch
next to the disputed land and the fences made it appear
that the disputed land was included in the property
purchased. The defendant’s parents used the disputed land
for walking cows from pasture to the milking area,
allowing the cows to pasture temporarily on the disputed
land. The plaintiff occasionally used the disputed land for
hunting and had to climb over, under or walk around the
fence in order to enter the disputed land. The trial court
had ruled for the plaintiff because the disputed land was
not entirely fenced in. The appellate court held that the
defendant’s use of the disputed land was sufficient to
amount to actual possession given the partial fencing of
the land, since the defendant’s use would not have been
possible if the third side was fenced. However, because
the land was transferred from the defendant’s parents to
the defendant less than 21 years before the dispute and the
transferred title made no mention of the disputed land, the
defendant could not include the parents’ possession;
therefore, the defendant did not have possession long
enough to give rise to title by adverse possession. Moore
v. Duran, 687 A.2d 822 (Pa. Super. 1996).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtors had claimed a homestead
exemption for their residence under 188 Mass. Gen. Laws
§ 1. The trustee objected to the exemption to the extent of
debts incurred by the debtors prior to their filing of a
homestead declaration. The court denied the objection,
holding that Section 522(c) pre-empted the state law
limitations on the homestead exemption and allowed the
exemption as to all pre-petition debts. In re Whalen-
Griffin, 206 B.R. 277 (Bankr. D, Mass. 1997).
    Chapter 12   -ALM § 13.03.*
CLAIM . The debtor was a co-obligor with the
debtor’s parent on a secured loan. The debtor and parent
operated separate farm operations, although the
